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Legislative Fractionalization and Partisan Shifts to the Left Increase the
Volatility of Public Energy R&D ExpendituresI
Leonardo Baccini1, Johannes Urpelainen2
Abstract
This article shows that legislative fractionalization and leftward (but not rightward) partisan shifts increase
the volatility of public R&D expenditures in new energy technologies. We develop a highly accurate estimator
for public energy R&D expenditures, and examine deviations from the estimated values using data for
member states of the International Energy Agency, 1981-2007. Given that unpredictable fluctuation in
public spending on new energy technology reduces the positive effect of such spending on innovation, our
empirical analyses imply that countries with fractionalized legislatures can improve the performance of their
energy technology programs through institutional mechanisms that reduce the volatility of public spending.
Similarly, the results indicate that left-wing and right-wing governments can improve the performance of
public technology programs through agreements that distribute gains in such a fashion that partisan shifts
do not cause spending cuts. Contravening the conventional wisdom, we also find that public energy R&D is
unusually stable in the United States.
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1. Introduction
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), there is a “global gap” between current levels of
public energy R&D and those warranted by environmental and energy security problems (IEA, 2010). New
energy technologies could reduce countries’ vulnerability to oil price shocks and mitigate climate change, but
governments have not made large investments in new energy technologies. Public energy R&D is important
because the private sector does not fully internalize the positive externalities from energy technology inno-
vation (Margolis and Kammen, 1999). While companies can sell new energy technologies for profit, many of
the indirect benefits of such technologies cannot be commercialized (Fischer and Newell, 2008). For example,
new clean energy technologies such as offshore wind power can help governments mitigate climate change
and reduce air pollution. These benefits are public goods, so private companies underprovide them.
The problem of underinvestment is compounded by expenditure volatility. The development of new
energy technologies is a long process, and investments begin to produce net profits only after years of R&D
(Gru¨bler et al., 1999). Unreliable “boom and bust” technology programs rarely produce substantial social
benefits because they are not being implemented in full (Cohen and Noll, 1991). The government invests
substantial sums of money in the early years even if the productivity of those investments is limited, and
then suddenly reduces funding as the program finally advances towards commercialization. This threat of
abrupt termination reduces the effectiveness of technology programs.
Uncertainty also reduces private investors’ incentives to participate in technology programs because the
availability of future public funding is uncertain (IEA, 2007). A key benefit of public technology programs
is that they can leverage complementary private investments, and thus multiply the benefits of the public
investment (IEA, 2010). But if private investors do not believe that the program is durable, they have
little incentive to invest given the long time from initial research to profitable commercialization (Norberg-
Bohm, 2000). If governments are unable to commit to stable technology programs in the long run, how are
companies supposed to invest in clean technology innovation?
The United States solar photovoltaics commercialization program offers a useful illustration of the con-
sequences of volatility. Under high oil prices, the size of the program increased from 4.6 in 1974 to 177.0
2
million dollars in 1980, and then decreased to 46.6 in 1984 (Pelgram, 1991, 326). While the program did
reduce the cost of electricity generation from solar photovoltaics, Pelgram (1991, 341-342) argues that the
volatility of the budgetary appropriations implies that during rapidly increasing expenditures, “incremental
dollars were spent on activities with fairly low productivity ... because it was a long-term program, one
would expect that its chance for success would have improved if the boom and bust pattern of the decade
after 1975 had been replaced by a smoother path of expenditures.”
This article presents a statistical analysis of the causes of energy R&D volatility. Using data on public
energy R&D by IEA member states, 1981-2007, we demonstrate that legislative fractionalization (multiple
small parties competing for political influence) and shifts to the left in the executive’s partisanship contribute
to volatility. Consequently, institutional innovations that enable fractionalized governments to credibly
commit to a consistent technology policy could help reduce the volatility of public energy R&D. For example,
governments in countries with high legislative fractionalization could establish trust funds for technology
programs and delegate their governance to independent regulators.
These findings are relevant for policy because both volatility and underinvestment have been common in
industrialized countries. Figure 1 shows the total public R&D investment in non-fossil fuel energy technologies
in IEA member states, 1976-2007. Public investment reached high levels in the aftermath of the second oil
crisis in 1979, but since then the levels have declined. Additionally, the overall levels have shown remarkable
volatility, especially during high oil prices in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.
The literature on public energy R&D recognizes the problem (Cohen and Noll, 1991; Fuss et al., 2008;
Nemet, 2010; Nemet and Kammen, 2007). However, few studies examine the causes of the problem. Cohen
and Noll (1991) argue that in the United States, federal technology programs have been volatile because it
is difficult for the government and legislators to build a large and stable support coalition for technology
programs. Additionally, budget constraints and business cycles prevent the executive and legislature from
credibly committing to stable support levels over time. Dooley (1998) argues that deregulation has under-
mined governments’ incentives to invest resources in public energy R&D, but his analysis focuses mostly
on levels at the expense of volatility Other than these arguments, the causes of volatility in public energy
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Figure 1: Total public energy R&D in non-fossil fuel energy technologies for 22 OECD countries that are IEA members,
1976-2007. The values are in millions of USD, 2009 constant prices.
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R&D remain poorly understood. While volatility has also been an issue in many European economies, such
as Germany and Italy, scholars have mostly not analyzed the causes and consequences of volatile research
expenditures in other industrialized countries than the United States. This article fills this research gap.
2. Hypotheses
In this section, we offer two preliminary hypotheses on the political causes of volatility. First, we hypoth-
esize that countries with fractionalized legislatures are unable to avoid volatility and incredible commitments.
Second, partisan shifts in the government will also increase volatility due to the ruling coalition’s changing
Hypothesis 1. Legislative fractionalization increases the volatility of public energy R&D.
By legislative fractionalization, we refer to a situation wherein multiple small parties in the legislature
compete for political influence (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Nooruddin, 2010). In some countries, governments
are often relatively unified because one or two parties possess a clear legislative majority. For example,
fractionalization is generally low in the United Kingdom because of the country’s two-party system. An
example is the 1979 general election, which gave Margaret Thatcher’s conservatives a safe majority by 43
seats. Conversely, Italy’s fractionalization levels have been generally high. For example, during the 1980-
1992 period, Italy was governed by the pentapartito coalition of five major political parties. Given the high
number of parties, the legislature was highly fractionalized.
Our general premise is that parties with a clear legislative majority can produce new legislation with
relative ease. In other countries, multiple small parties compete for political influence and form complex
governing coalitions. Consequently, fractionalized legislatures are much less predictable than those charac-
terized by low fractionalization.
Why would legislative fractionalization specifically increase the volatility of public energy R&D? Accord-
ing to previous research, legislative fractionalization reduces the executive’s ability to consistently implement
useful policies, especially with regard to allocating public expenditures (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Roubini
and Sachs, 1989). Annual budgetary decisions require intensive bargaining, and the political cost of such
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bargaining is maximized if multiple parties with different interests must find a compromise (Weingast and
Marshall, 1988). Given the complexity of such bargaining, it is difficult to predict the level and nature of
public energy R&D. Previously funded technology programs may be removed as a concession to their oppo-
nents, and new ones may be created to reward their supporters. Previous technology programs may also be
canceled or new ones be enacted as part of a larger legislative package.
Hypothesis 2. Partisan shifts increase the volatility of public energy R&D.
By partisan shifts, we refer to changes in the ruling government’s partisan ideology. If a leftist party
wins the election, so that a left-wing executive replaces a right-wing executive, then a leftward partisan shift
has occurred. In democratic countries, such shifts usually stem from an incumbent government’s electoral
defeat. An example is the Social Democrat Gerhard Schroeder’s replacing the Christian Democrat Helmut
Kohl as the Chancellor in the 1998 German elections. These shifts are not to be conflated with legislative
fractionalization, however, as partisan shifts occur at all levels of legislative fractionalization.
Partisan shifts increase volatility for several reasons. First, partisan ideology influences the government’s
preferences (Boix, 2000; Garrett, 1998; Potrafke, 2010). If a left-wing government replaces a right-wing
government, it may terminate technology programs that the right-wing government supported, such as
nuclear research. In Germany, a clear cleavage between the Social Democrats (opponents) and the Christian
Democrats (supporters) regarding nuclear power has shaped their policies (Jahn, 1992).3 Second, both
left-wing and right-wing governments may have particular reasons to terminate the previous government’s
programs. Left-wing governments may oppose subsidies to wealthy high-technology companies, whereas
right-wing governments may pursue electoral gains from removing “wasteful” technology programs that the
previous left-wing government had enacted.
There are no clear theoretical reasons to expect that leftward and rightward shifts would produce different
effects, so we refrain from formulating theoretical hypotheses regarding asymmetric effects. The possibility
3In other countries, such as France, this has not been the case (Hecht, 2009).
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of such asymmetry is ultimately an empirical question. Below, we show that leftward but not rightward
shifts have historically increased the volatility of public energy R&D in industrialized countries.
3. Research Design
Volatility is a difficult analytical concept because it is not directly observable. Therefore, we first have
to develop a measure for it. Our approach builds on previous literature. First, we develop an estimator
for public energy R&D across different countries and over time. Second, we verify that the estimator is an
accurate one, so that it correlates very highly with real public energy R&D expenditures. Third, we treat
the difference between the estimate and the real data as volatility. Fourth, we examine whether legislative
fractionalization and partisan shifts are determinants of such volatility.
In the empirical analysis, we rely on data on public energy R&D expenditures for new (non-fossil fuel)
energy technologies from the IEA.4 The dataset contains annual data on public energy R&D for 16 IEA
members and the years 1976-2007. The sectors included in the data are hydroenergy, non-hydro renewables,
energy efficiency, nuclear, storage and conversion, and other energy sources. We exclude fuel cells because
governments have begun to invest in them only very recently. The data are provided in millions USD using
constant 2009 prices. A list of the countries with summary statistics for key variables will be provided below.
From the data analysis, we excluded six of the 22 possible countries. First, we exclude Australia because
the country has reported its public energy R&D levels for fewer than ten years. Given this, we cannot estimate
the volatility. Second, we exclude five countries – Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, and Turkey –
because they invest very little in public energy R&D in all years. Given the extremely low investment levels,
analyzing volatility in these countries is not relevant for policy formation. To be sure, we also present results
for an empirical analysis including all six countries below. From some but not all of the statistical models,
we also lose Switzerland because data on partisanship are missing.
We convert the data from total values into per capita values to account for variation in country size.
The population data are from the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) and measured in
4See http://www.iea.org/stats/rd.asp. Accessed on May 29, 2011.
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millions of inhabitants.5 Therefore, all per capita measures are given in USD with 2009 constant prices.
3.1. Dependent Variable: Volatility
In general, volatility refers to deviations from a stable and smooth pattern of change. Thus, changes
in public energy R&D are not equivalent to volatility. Instead, volatility should be regarded as deviations
from an expected pattern. How, then, can we develop an accurate estimator for public energy R&D? Our
estimator comprises a number of independent variables that we use to predict public energy R&D. First, we
include country fixed effects. This variable allows us to capture variation in average investment in public
energy R&D across countries. Second, we include the lagged value of public energy R&D to account for
temporal trends and the possible stickiness of public energy R&D. Finally, we use oil prices to account for
common exogenous shocks that induce demand for new energy technologies, notably alternative energy. For
oil prices, we use the price of Saudi light crude oil, measured in constant 2000 USD. This oil price is almost
perfectly correlated with alternative measures, such as West Texas or Brent, so the choice of the specific
measure is innocuous.
The results of this estimation are reported in Table 1. The model fits the data very well, with an R2 of
0.92. This statistic states that the model can explain 92 per cent of the variation in the data. The difference
between the predicted value and the actual data point – the residual – can then be transformed into a
measure of volatility by using the absolute value. Transformed in this fashion, both positive and negative
deviations from the trend count as volatility. Notably, the volatility variable is proportional to per capita
expenditures in USD with 2009 constant prices. Therefore, our volatility measure has a natural substantive
interpretation.
Figure 2 shows the actual public energy R&D for the countries included in the dataset, whereas Figure
3 shows the estimated volatility for the same countries. One particularly notable feature here is the high
volatility of the data during high oil prices in the aftermath of the 1979 oil crisis. This observation is
reassuring, as it is consistent with the qualitative literature on the volatile nature of energy policy in these
years (Cohen and Noll, 1991; Graetz, 2011; Joppke, 1992-1993).
5See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international. Accessed on June 3, 2011.
8
VARIABLES Energy R&D (pc)
Energy R&D pc (lag) 0.84***
(0.05)
Oil Price 0.03***
(0.01)
Country fixed effects yes
Observations 389
Number of Countries 16
R2 0.92
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1: A regression model of per capita public energy R&D that allows the operationalization of volatility. In the empirical
analysis to follow, volatility is operationalized for each country-year as the absolute value of the difference between the prediction
from this regression model and the actual public energy R&D.
Figure 2: Per capita public energy R&D (USD, 2009 constant prices) for the countries included in the dataset. Switzerland is
omitted from some statistical models due to missing data for partisanship.
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Figure 3: Volatility of per capita public energy R&D (USD, 2009 constant prices) in the countries included in the dataset.
Switzerland is omitted from some statistical models due to missing data for partisanship.
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To scrutinize the robustness of our estimator, we also added the square of the lagged R&D level in the
model. If our current estimator is valid, this addition should not produce very different results. If our current
estimator is invalid, perhaps due to nonlinear time effects, it should improve the fit of the regression model.
We found that the square term is not statistically significant, and the increase in the R2 was less than 0.001.
Thus, nonlinearity does not seem to be a concern here.
We also considered logarithmizing the per capita values, so as to capture relative instead of absolute
volatility. It turned out that the logarithmization results in a highly nonlinear sample, so that a conventional
regression method cannot be used. However, we were able to estimate a model that assumes a two-parameter
beta distribution.6 This estimation is provided in the appendix, and it shows that our results are robust.
As another alternative, we also construct an ARCH model that allows us to simultaneously estimate
public energy R&D levels and the volatility of these estimates. The ARCH model is more flexible than our
primary approach, but it is very difficult to include more than a handful of explanatory variables in the
model without causing a convergence failure. Thus, we report results from our primary specification and a
simplified ARCH model.
3.2. Explanatory Variables: Legislative Fractionalization, Partisan Shifts
To operationalize legislative fractionalization, we use the legislative fractionalization measure from the
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001). This measure indicates the probability that two
randomly chosen legislators are from two different political parties. Thus, it gives a simple and coherent
measure for the number of political parties in the legislature. If many small parties compete for political
influence, the fractionalization measure obtains a high value. If the number of parties is low, it obtains a
low value. To verify the robustness of our results, we also use a government fractionalization measure. It
indicates the probability that two randomly chosen legislatures within the government are from two different
political parties. Thus, it excludes the opposition.
For partisan shifts we use a measure of partisanship from the DPI. It indicates the partisan orientation of
6For details, see Paolino (2001); Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004); Smithson and Verkuilen (2006). The model is intended
for distributions that fall on the [0, 1] interval, and our logarithmized measure meets this condition. In Stata 12, this model is
estimated by the “betafit” command.
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the executive: left, centre, or right. A country-year is coded“right” in cases of parties defined as conservative,
Christian democratic, or right-wing; and “left” in cases of parties defined as communist, socialist, social
democratic, or left-wing. Centrist parties serve as the baseline. These measures are converted into partisan
shifts as follows. First, a “right shift” occurs if the government’s partisanship shifts towards the right from
the previous year. Second, a “left shift” occurs if the government’s partisanship shifts towards the left from
the previous year. Table 2 provides information regarding the dependent variable and the main explanatory
variables.
Country Energy R&D pc Volatility Frac Right Left Shift Right Shift Left
Austria 5.72 0.81 0.64 7 25 2 1
Belgium 14.56 1.49 0.85 31 1 1 1
Canada 11.98 1.12 0.58 10 22 3 2
Denmark 9.93 1.66 0.80 16 16 3 2
Finland 19.51 2.85 0.80 3 17 4 3
France 14.88 1.03 0.68 14 15 8 3
Germany 10.35 2.07 0.68 17 13 4 1
Italy 16.07 2.82 0.67 7 6 5 3
Japan 28.66 1.78 0.64 28 2 3 1
Netherlands 15.61 1.93 0.78 20 11 4 1
Norway 11.37 1.51 0.74 14 17 5 3
Spain 3.46 0.98 0.63 8 16 3 2
Sweden 14.50 1.71 0.73 3 24 4 3
Switzerland 24.7 1.27 0.81 – – – –
United Kingdom 8.07 0.97 0.54 18 13 3 1
United States 12.34 0.92 0.49 18 13 3 2
Table 2: Summary statistics for key variables by country. The cells show mean values, except for the partisan variables they
show the number of years with a positive observation.
3.3. Control Variables
To account for possible alternate covariates of volatility, we control in some of our models for additional
variables. One set of control variables pertains to the energy sector, and the data are from the EIA. First,
energy intensity could reduce volatility if governments have strong incentives to create robust technology
programs under wasteful energy use. We thus divide a country’s energy consumption by its GDP. Second,
hydropower endows a country with a reliable source of electricity at a low variable cost, and this could
reduce volatility because large technology programs are rarely needed. We thus divide annual hydroelectricity
generation by total electricity generation. Third, nuclear power could also have these effects, so we construct
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a similar variable for nuclear electricity generation. Finally, we include the price of Saudi light crude oil to
account for the possibility that high oil prices create boom and bust cycles in technology programs.7
Another set of control variables pertains to the economy. These variables are from the OECD and the
World Development Indicators (WDI). First, we include GDP per capita to account for the possibility that
wealthy countries are less frugal with regard to public energy R&D, and thus volatility would increase (WDI).
Second, we account for trade openness – the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP – because export-
oriented economies could initiate large technology programs for export promotion purposes (WDI). Third,
we include the share of heavy industry of total GDP to account for the possibility that the industrial sector is
able to lobby for large technology programs that increase the total volatility of public energy R&D (OECD).
Next, we include year fixed effects to account for common exogenous shocks that the oil price variable
fails to capture.8 For example, year fixed effects capture common shocks in the energy issue area, such as
the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident. Summary statistics are reported in Table 3.
We also estimate a model that adds a categorical control variable for the level of public energy R&D in a
country. It seems natural to expect that large spenders also see more volatility. However, we cannot include
the level itself in the regression because it is correlated with the volatility measure by definition. Thus, we
create a categorical variable that measures whether a country-year is in the first, second, third, or fourth
quartile of per capita R&D in the total dataset. The variable ranges from 0 to 4. This categorical variable
allows us to account for the effect of level on volatility.
Finally, in one model we include total R&D expenditures as a share of GDP, as reported in the OECD
Main Science and Technology Indicators. We do not include this variable in all of the specifications because
we would lose approximately 40 observations due to missing data.
7Given that we include the oil price both in the estimator of public energy R&D levels and the volatility model, we also
verified that our results hold if we instead use a simple categorical variable that codes oil prices as very low, low, high, and very
high.
8We do not include country fixed effects because one of our main variables, legislative fractionalization, varies much more
across countries than over time. In some of the models, however, we use a random effects specification.
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N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Energy R&D pc 412 13.75 8.25 1.03 37.71
Volatility 389 1.52 1.79 0 13.44
Fractionalization 496 0.69 0.11 0.41 0.90
Shift Left 506 0.06 0.23 0 1
Shift Right 506 0.17 0.38 0 1
Partisanship 463 0.01 0.96 -1 1
Energy Intensity (log) 436 8.77 0.35 8.06 9.74
Nuclear Share 437 0.24 0.21 0 0.79
Hydro Share 437 0.28 0.30 0 1
Oil Price 448 24.48 10.48 10.03 55.94
GDP pc (log) 506 9.97 0.31 9.07 10.65
Trade / GDP 506 33.37 16.26 7 89
Heavy Industry 469 14.00 3.54 5.96 22.44
Energy R&D pc(categorical) 506 2.50 1.12 1 4
Other R&D / GDP 373 1.94 0.67 0.40 4.13
Table 3: Summary statistics for the regression analysis of volatility.
3.4. Findings
The results are reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6. The first table presents the five primary models that
we use. The only difference between them is the choice of control variables. The second table shows the
coefficients for the primary explanatory variables for six additional models based on model (3) in the previous
table: random effects, using government instead of legislative fractionalization, with bootstrapped standard
errors; including the six initially excluded countries; excluding the years 2005-2007; excluding the years
1981-1984. The third table presents an alternative estimation of volatility using an ARCH model with an
AR(1) correction for serial correlation. This alternative model allows us to directly estimate the volatility
of the public energy R&D instead of constructing an a priori indicator such as the one describe above (see
appendix for a full description).9 Thus, it allows us to scrutinize the robustness of our empirical findings.
The results show that both fractionalization and leftward partisan shifts have strong and statistically
consistent positive effects on volatility. Fractionalized legislatures produce less reliable public energy R&D
expenditures with substantial fluctation from one year to the next, and leftward shifts in partisanship have
similar effects. The only exception to this robust result is the ARCH model for leftward partisan shifts. Here
9The selection of variables is guided by the statistical requirement of convergence. We included as many variables as possible
without causing the model not to converge.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility
Fractionalization 3.34*** 3.35*** 5.41*** 4.87*** 3.42***
(0.75) (0.83) (1.29) (1.40) (1.09)
Shift Left 0.90** 1.02** 0.99** 1.05** 1.05**
(0.41) (0.38) (0.39) (0.42) (0.42)
Shift Right 0.89 0.45 0.41 0.35 0.15
(0.57) (0.33) (0.33) (0.39) (0.45)
Partisanship -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
Energy Intensity (log) 0.02 0.43 0.18 -0.16
(0.38) (0.25) (0.31) (0.29)
Nuclear Share -0.31 -0.77 -0.99* -1.16***
(0.33) (0.54) (0.50) (0.26)
Hydro Share -0.48 -0.40 -0.25 -0.04
(0.32) (0.34) (0.40) (0.32)
Oil Price -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP pc (log) -0.07 -0.82 -1.17**
(0.56) (0.49) (0.49)
Trade / GDP -0.02* -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Heavy Industry 0.05 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Other R&D / GDP 0.42 0.29
(0.25) (0.24)
Energy R&D pc (categorical) 0.41***
(0.10)
Constant -1.49** -1.32 -5.56 3.92 10.84
(0.68) (3.82) (6.07) (5.95) (6.74)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 346 336 334 298 298
R2 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.28
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Empirical results. This table shows the three main models.
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Random Effects Gov. Frac. Bootstrap
Fractionalization 5.41*** 1.57** 1.57***
(1.25) 0.57 (0.47)
Shift Left 0.99*** 0.76** 0.76**
(0.38) (0.34) (0.35)
Shift Right 0.41 0.22 0.22
(0.37) (0.28) (0.32)
R2 0.22 0.20 0.20
All Countries 1981-2004 1984-2007
Fractionalization 4.95*** 5.26*** 4.35***
(1.28) 1.43 (0.79)
Shift Left 0.76** 1.23** 1.07*
(0.32) (0.46) 0.55
Shift Right 0.23 0.45 0.48
(0.27) (0.36) (0.37)
R2 0.21 0.23 0.21
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Empirical results. This table table shows the regression output excluding the coefficients for control variables and the
number of observations.
the coefficient is very close to zero and not statistically significant.
Why do leftward partisan shifts have large effects on volatility, whereas rightward shifts do not? One
possible explanation is that while left-wing governments have incentives to initiate large technology programs
given their willingness to increase public spending to correct market failures, they could also be particularly
willing to reduce public energy R&D by terminating previous technology programs upon replacing a right-
wing government.
The following example illustrates the role of legislative fractionalization and leftward partisan shifts. In
August 1983, the head of the Italian Socialist Party, Beneditto “Bettino” Craxi, began his term as the Prime
Minister of Italy. This was a clear example of leftward shift because the previous Prime Minister, Amintore
Fanfani, whose term lasted less than a year, was the leader of the Christian Democrats. Additionally, Craxi’s
tenure was characterized by high levels of legislative fractionalization. The government was based on the
pentapartito, an alliance of five parties: Christian Democrats, the Italian Socialists, the Italian Democratic
Socialists, the Italian Republicans, and the Italian Liberal Party. With five parties holding very different
preferences in the legislature, Craxi was forced to forge compromises to retain his rule and implement new
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES Energy R&D pc HET
Energy R&D pc (lag) 0.14***
(0.01)
Fractionalization 3.72***
(0.11)
Shift Left -0.08
(0.39)
Shift Right 0.01
(0.51)
Partisanship -0.15
(0.15)
Energy Intensity (log) 6.84*** -0.02
(2.17) (0.02)
Nuclear Share -1.23 -0.76
(2.82) (0.75)
Hydro Share 1.06 -0.07
(2.02) (0.36)
Oil Price 0.02** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant -49.06*** -3.44***
(18.33) (0.06)
AR(1) 0.99***
(0.01)
ARCH 0.30**
(0.12)
Year fixed effects no no
Observations 336 336
Number of countries 15 15
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Empirical results. This table shows the estimation of the ARCH model. In this model, the column HET indicates the
effect of a variable on volatility.
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policies.
While the Socialist Party’s position on nuclear power had been ambivalent during the elections, Craxi
emphasized the importance of ambitious investment in nuclear research (Franchino, 2011, 15). According to
our statistical model, the early years of Craxi’s tenure were characterized by exceptionally high volatility. In
October 1983, the government approved a new program on “research on nuclear fusion, fulfilling an electoral
pledge of the Socialist Party” (Franchino, 2011, 15). Indeed, our data show that the 1984 budget allocated
almost two billion dollars to energy research, a 500 million increase from the Christian Democrats’ 1983
budget. Of the two billions, more than 1.6 billion dollars were allocated to nuclear research. However, by
1987, in Craxi’s last budget, funding for nuclear research had again fallen to less than 900 million dollars
while the total energy budget fell to 1.4 billion dollars. One of the pentapartito’s failures was energy policy, as
the government failed to “design workable energy policies in the face of resistance to nuclear power.”10 This
case, then, illustrates a leftist government’s aggressive but temporary investment in energy research based
on an earlier electoral promise. Perhaps due to the 1986 Chernobyl accident and the declining popularity of
nuclear power in Italy, the fractionalized and internally divided ruling coalition’s emphasis on energy research
did not last more than three years.
Figure 4 shows for each country the mean volatility as a function of mean fractionalization. This figure
shows that the statistical result is not a mathematical artifact. Mean volatility increases rapidly with
fractionalization. A particularly interesting finding pertains to the fact that the United States actually has
an unusually low level of volatility. Even though the country has reduced public energy R&D spending over
time, it has done so in a relatively consistent fashion. The only exception to this rule are the first years in
the aftermath of the 1979 oil crisis. This, we note, cuts against the conventional wisdom: according to Laird
and Stefes (2009, 2626), in the United States “sharp conflicts between the executive and legislative branches
mean that outside groups cannot predict where the policy is going to go.” Our empirical analysis shows that
this is not true: the United States has the lowest volatility among OECD countries. The real problem for
the United States is the low per capita level of spending, not volatility.
10“In New Italy Crisis, a Drastic Proposal” New York Times on February 23, 1987.
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Figure 4: Average volatility of per capita public energy R&D in a country as a function of average fractionalization in the
legislature. The figure shows the quadratic fit and the 95 per cent confidence intervals (dashed line), as well as the lowess
estimator (solid line).
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Figure 5: Volatility of per capita public energy R&D as a function of shifts in the government’s partisanship.
Figure 5 illustrates the effects of partisan shifts on volatility in the data. It shows that the median
volatility is much higher under leftward shifts than without them, and that a similar effect does not exist for
rightward shifts. Interestingly, though, the largest individual observations of volatility do not correspond to
leftward shifts. This is mostly due to the relatively low number of leftward shifts in the data.
Regarding other volatility influences, the year fixed effects reveal an interesting pattern. Of them, the
following years were statistically significant: 1981, 1983, 1986, and 1989. Of these, 1986 was the year of
the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Unsurprisingly, the volatility of public energy R&D increased temporarily
at that time. The years 1981 and 1983 capture the salience of energy policy following the 1979 Iranian
revolution and the unusually high oil prices.
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3.5. Robustness
To examine the robustness of our findings, in addition to the models presented above we estimated ad-
ditional regressions. First, we included a measure of political corruption from the International Country
Risk Guide to account for the possibility that volatility is influenced by the difficulty of competent imple-
mentation. This variable did not have a statistically significant effect on volatility in our models, and all
our main results continue to hold. Second, we included a country’s population to account for the possibility
that small countries are more volatile due to the smaller absolute size of their technology programs. This
variable also did not have a statistically significant effect on volatility, and the results continue to hold.
Third, we removed year dummies from the estimations. We found that oil prices now have a statistically
significant and positive effect on volatility, and all our results continue to hold. Finally, we estimated our
models without the partisanship variables to capture Switzerland. The effect of fractionalization remained
positive and statistically significant.
4. Conclusion
This article has shown that legislative fractionalization and leftward partisan shifts increase the volatility
of public energy R&D. As such, the article offers two primary contributions. First, the results are highly
relevant to policy formation. They indicate that countries with fragmented legislatures and governments can
enhance the reliability and consistency of their technology programs by developing institutional responses
to the problem of policy gridlock in the presence of multiple small parties. For example, these countries
could increase the delegation of authority to bureaucracies and create long-run technology programs with
capital endowments that allow them to survive changes in the composition of the government. For left-wing
governments, the results highlight the importance of developing political countermeasures against technology
policy volatility in the early years of their tenure. For example, left-wing governments and right-wing
governments could agree to implement technology programs that help them realize joint political gains. Such
programs would be less vulnerable to partisan shifts, and the partisan agreement could be made credible
through a public declaration and legislation to increase the consistency and resilience of long-run technology
programs.
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The second contribution pertains to methodology. The estimation of volatility presents a major empir-
ical challenge, yet the importance of applied research on volatility is difficult to overestimate in an era of
unprecedented volatility in such factors as global commodity prices and technology policy. We have provided
in this article a simple, easily replicated, and robust estimator of volatility. Our empirical results on the
determinants of the volatility of public energy R&D testify to the value of this estimator.
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Appendix A: Logarithmized Per Capita Public Energy R&D
Table 7 summarizes the prediction regression when we use the natural logarithm of the per capita public
energy R&D instead of the raw value. Table 8 shows the volatility estimates using the beta regression.
The coefficients are as expected. Note that the coefficient for Φ is used to characterize the estimated beta
distribution.
VARIABLES Energy R&D pc (log)
Energy R&D pc (log, lag) 0.869***
(0.032)
Oil Price 0.003***
(0.001)
Constant 0.126*
(0.074)
Country fixed effects yes
Observations 389
Number of countries 16
R2 0.93
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: A regression model of the natural logarithm of per capita public energy R&D. This model is used to construct our
volatility measure.
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VARIABLES Volatility
Fractionalization 0.88*
(0.50)
Shift Left 0.32**
(0.15)
Shift Right 0.16
(0.19)
Partisanship -0.14*
(0.08)
Φ 6.92***
(1.28)
Constant -2.50***
(0.43)
Year fixed effects yes
Observations 346
Number of countries 15
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Estimation of the main model using the natural logarithm of per capita public energy R&D and a two-parameter beta
distribution.
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Appendix B: ARCH Model
In Table 6 we estimate a heteroskedastic regression, i.e. a regression with a separate equation for the
variance of the errors. Then we model the variance of the errors as a function of our two main independent
variables, fractionalization and partisan shift toward left. By doing so, we do not construct a measure of
volatility ex ante, but we jointly estimate the level of the dependent variable (public energy R&D expenditure
per capita) and the variance in the errors of the model. Using the resulting estimates, we can test our
hypotheses about the sources of volatility, i.e. sources of variability in the error process. Such an approach
has two main advantages. First, it is relatively simple to implement. Second, it is very flexible since it does
not use any a priori measures of volatility but instead allows the data to speak for themselves.
We implement this test using an ARCH1 approach that is one particular variation in the GARCH family
of models. ARCH1 implies that we are able to detect large errors between times t and t− 1. Moreover, we
allow for first-order autoregressive-conditional heteroskedasticity (AR1) in the variance equation to account
for temporal dependence. As we did in previous estimation, we use robust standard errors. Formally, we
estimate the following model:
EnergyRDpcit = β0 + β1OilPriceit + β2ln(EnergyInt)it + (1)
β3NuclearShareit + β4HydroShareit + β5σ
2
it + it
σit = exp(α0 + α1Fracit + α2ShiftLeftit + α3ShiftRightit + (2)
α4Partisanshipit + α5ln(EnergyInt)it +
α6NuclearShareit + α7HydroShareit + α8OilPriceit),
where i denotes country and t denotes year. A high value of σ2 indicates a high volatility, as shown in
the column HET in Table 6. We estimate this model using the Stata command ARCH. With all covariates
included, the model does not converge even after 1,000 iterations. Therefore, we dropped the minimal number
of control variables that is necessary to achieve convergence. Using this conservative approach, our model
converges already after 39 iterations.
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